first paragraph
of this opinion, in which Knox alleges that the
February 4,
1999, contempt hearing violated her constitutional
rights. The
trial court dismissed this petition on May 21, 1999,
finding as
follows:
No authority is
offered, nor does the Court
know of any
authority which would allow a
Second petition
of this type to be filed.
The prior order
stated that the “First”
petition or
request to modify or vacate was
denied. The
Court does not reach any other
issues raised
due to this procedural issue
which is
dispositive.
This appeal
followed.
II.
The apparent
basis for the trial court’s dismissal of
Knox’s petition
was the court’s perception that the petition was
another attempt
by Knox to challenge the trial court’s initial
order directing
her to pay child support. We do not agree with
the trial
court’s interpretation of this pleading. In construing
post-judgment
motions, substance must prevail over form.
Tennessee
Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmer, 970 S.W.2d 453, 455
(Tenn. 1998).
Upon reviewing Knox’s “[s]econd petition”, we find
that this
pleading is, in substance, a motion to alter or amend
the order of
the trial court finding Knox in contempt. See Rule
59.04,
Tenn.R.Civ.P. Knox properly filed this pleading within
thirty days of
the entry of the challenged order. See Rule
59.02,
Tenn.R.Civ.P. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court
erred in failing
to consider Knox’s post-judgment pleading. The
trial court
should have ignored the misnomer of Knox’s pleading
and focused
instead on the substance of that document. To the
extent that it
challenges the correctness of the February 4,