CONTRACTS I OUTLINE

 

I.  MUTUAL ASSENT

 

The formation of a K (normally) requires a bargain.  R2K § 17(1).  A bargain is an agreement to exchange promises or to exchange a promise for a performance or to exchange performances.  R2K § 3.

 

A.  The Objective Test.  The courts apply an objective test (manifestation of

mutual assent) to determine whether there has been an offer or an acceptance.  What the parties subjectively intended does not matter.  Rather the courts consider "would a reasonable person, given the facts and circumstances, have understood a bargain was formed?"

 

            1.  Subjective, unstated intent is irrelevant.  Embry  "Neither the real nor the apparent intention that a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract."  R2K § 21.

 

            2.  Contract enforceable notwithstanding:  1) party claims he is drunk,  2) thought it was a joke.  Lucy v. Zehmer  If a K has but one reasonable meaning, a court will enforce it despite the parties' hidden intentions.  R2K § 71.

 

            3.  A court will not enforce an agreement where the P ought to have under­stood that the offerees did not realize they were entering into a legally enforceable deal.  Cohen & "social dating case"   Promissory Estoppel:  promise made, I relied on it, it was reasonable, it would be unfair not to enforce the promise.

 

 

B.  The Mechanics of Offer and Acceptance

 

            1.  Offer  - creates the power in the offeree to make a contract between the parties by an appropriate acceptance. 

 

            To have a valid contract, ordinarily? one party must make an offer which is conditional on receipt by the offeror of some act or promise by the offeree, and the offer must be accepted as to all its terms by the offeree.

 

            An offer is a manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.  R2K § 24.

 

                        a.  An invitation to negotiate does not constitute an offer.  Fisher

 

                        b.  If the other person has reason to know that the person making the "offer" does not intend it as an expression of his fixed purpose until he has given a further expression of his assent, no offer has been made. Lonergan, R2K § 26.

 

                        c.  Whether an offer has been made is to be determined from the writings of the parties plus all of the surrounding circumstances.  Southworth  Surround­ing circumstances may alter the normal meaning of words.  For example, words may sound like an offer but clearly be made in jest.  999 bananas car purchase case.

 

            A. Requirements:  (1) manifestation of present contractual intent,  (2) certainty and definiteness of terms,  (3) communication to the offeree. R2K § 23.  Thus, there is no valid offer where A prepares an offer to B, intending to mail it, but never does.

 

            B.  Some Guides.Southworth  Would a reasonable person in the shoes of the offeree feel that if he accepted the proposal, a contract would be complete?  This is the most important test of all.

 

                        (1)  To whom made.  Proposals made to the public or a large group of persons (such as in advertisements) are more likely to be construed as mere invitations to make an offer.  Note:  a letter sent to more than one person may constitute an offer.  Jenkins Towel, Southworth

 

                        Multiple Acceptance Problem - reasonable person who receives offer form letter must realize D does not intend to sell his land dozens of times over.  Lonergan   A letter which refers to a potential sale to a third party may not be construed as a firm offer to the addressee.

 

                        (2)  Definiteness and certainty of terms.  The more definite the terms, the more likely an offer has been made.  This is a separate requirement for finding a valid offer.  An advertisement offered specific merchandise at a stated price to the first person to present himself.  There was no room for negotiation as the offer was clear, explicit, and definite. "Fur for sale" case. Lefkowitz

 

                        (3)  Language used.  The words or conduct used in the proposal must be words of offer rather than preliminary negotiation.  "I bid" suggests an offer.  "Are you interested?" suggests preliminary negotiation.  "I am offering" vs. "I am asking"  Courteen Seed.  Note:  such words are not essential.  Fairmount Glass,  Southworth.

 

                        If you ask for a firm offer, and back comes a price, a reasonable person would understand that an offer has been made.  (Fairmount Glass)   Although, as a general rule, price quotations are not offers, each case must be assessed on its own particular facts.

 

            Commit to memory:  An offer is the manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.  R2K § 24.

 

 

2) INDEFINITENESS

 

a)  The requirement of definiteness and certainty of terms.  The terms of the offer must be sufficiently clear and complete so that the court can determine what the parties intended and can fix damages in case of nonperformance.  [Restatement (Second) 32]

 

b) The essential terms.  A contract must cover (expressly or impliedly) the following four essential terms:  (1) parties to the contract;  (2) the subject matter of the contract;  (3) time for performance;  and  (4) price.

 

c)  Implication of reasonable terms.  The essential terms must either be expressly stated in the contract or be capable of reasonable implication from the agreement.  The general trend of the courts is to adopt a policy of liberal construction so as to uphold the reasonable expectations of the parties; thus, the court will usually imply reasonable terms (i.e., implied-in-fact terms from the dealings and relationship of the parties) where none are expressly covered by the parties.

 

(1)  Example - price.

 

            (a)  Where price is completely omitted.  Where the parties have made no provision for price but a charge was intended, the court will normally imply a "reasonable price" (e.g., fair market value of goods).

 

            (b)  Where the price stated is indefinite.  Often, however, where the parties have made some attempt to include terms on the price but it is stated in such a vague way as to unintelligible, the courts will often refuse to imply a reasonable price, and the contract will be unenforceable due to lack of certainty on an essential term.  For example, A agrees to employ B "at not exceeding $300 per week."

 

d)  THE Uniform Commercial Code.  In contracts for the sale of goods, the omission of one or more essential terms does not render an offer invalid, as long as it appears the parties intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.  [UCC 2-204]  In effect, the Restatement (2nd) 32 takes this same approach with respect to all contracts.

 

 

 

2.  ACCEPTANCE

 

Generally.  In order for a contract to exist, there must be an acceptance of the offer.  The acceptance (assent to the offer) must be in the same manner requested or authorized by the offeror.  The general rule (there are exceptions) is that the offer may be accepted only by the person to whom it is made.  Unless stated otherwise, offeror expects offeree to communicate acceptance.  (Acceptance only by invitation of the offeror, power of acceptance only resides with person to whom offeror intends it to reside, acceptance = consent to terms of offer).

 

A. Bilateral contracts.  Here the mere giving of the counter-promise to the offeror is all that is required.  The objective theory of contract prevails, and whether or not an acceptance has been given depends on how a reasonable person would interpret the words or conduct of the offeree.  But the offeree must have knowledge of the offer, and notice of acceptance to the offeror is generally required (there are exceptions, such as where the offeror indicates that no notice is required).

 

B.  Unilateral contracts.  A unilateral contract may be accpeted only by doing the act requested by the offeror, with knowledge of the offer and intent to accept it.  Normally notice to the offeror of acceptance is not required.  There are exceptions, such as where the offeror requires that notice be given or where the offeror has no reasonable means of knowing that the requested performance has been rendered, in which case there is a requirement that notice be given within a reasonable time after performance.

 

C.  The offeror has complete control over an offer.  He sets the terms for acceptance, including the time, manner of communication, and method of acceptance.  A contract where one of the required signatories never executes the document is not enforceable.  LaSalle  Offeror is the master of his offer; if he specifies exactly the mode that must be used for acceptance, that mode must be used (at least for Wirtz' class).

 

D.  Time for acceptance -- The power to create a contract by acceptance terminates at the time specified in the offer, or, if no time is specified, at the end of a reasonable time.  Ever-Tite Roofing

 

E.  Partial shipment of a customer's order does not constitute acceptance of the order.  Corinthian Pharmaceutical Systems  "I hear you" I accept.

 

F.  Where an offeree fails to comply with the suggested method of acceptance, but instead begins performance, a contract may be formed.  In Allied Steel, the suggested method of acceptance was not the only method since the words of the purchase order said "should" (softer than shall).  If the offeree failed to communicate its acceptance in the manner required by the offeror, then even though the offeree commenced performance, there may be no valid acceptance.  But in this case, performance was commenced with the full knowledge, consent, and acquiescence of the offeror.  Offeror thus waived his objection.   Note also that UCC 2-206(1) provides that unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language of the offer or by the circumstances, an offer to make a contract is to be construed as inviting acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable under the circumstances.  If the offeror prescribes an exclusive manner of acceptance, an attempt on the part of the offeree to accept the offer in a different manner does not bind the offeror.

 

G.  Revocation prior to communication of acceptance.  No contract arises if the offeror revokes the offer after the offeree manifests an intent to accept it but before the acceptance is communicated to the offeror.  Hendricks v. Behee  Notifi­cation to the other party's agent counts, not your own agent.  No consideration to form an option.  DISTINGUISH:  "manifestation of intent to accept" with "acceptance-commun­i­cated"

 

H.  Unilateral v. Bilateral contracts.  The legal distinction between the two affects revocation (i.e., if all the offeror wants is a return promise, and such a promise is given, revocation becomes impossible; but if the offeror requests an act as an acceptance, then the act itself must be performed or the offeror can still revoke the offer).

 

            (1)  Policy.  Where the offer is unclear as to whether a bilateral or unilateral contract is contemplated, it is the policy of the law to construe it as an offer for a bilateral contract.  [Restatement 31]

 

            (2)  Rationale.  A bilateral contract accords immediate rights and complete protection to both parties since a contract arises as soon as the offeree promises to perform; whereas an offer for a unilateral contract does not ripen into a binding contract until the performance is actually rendered.

 

            (3)  UCC position.  The UCC accepts this same policy.  The UCC states that unless an offer to buy goods expressly limits acceptance to shipment of the goods, it is to be construed as inviting acceptance either by shipment or by a prompt promise to ship the goods.  [UCC 2-206].

 

I.  Commercial Advertisement of a reward constitutes a unilateral contract offer. P's buying and using the medicine was the act called for.  Notification is not necessary in this situation, since D could hardly have expected all those using the product to give notification of acceptance.  No multiple acceptance problem - Carbolic Smoke Ball could pay each 100 pounds.

 

J.  Knowledge of offer.  A person whose act constitutes the performance requested in an offer of which the person was unaware will not be given the benefits of that contract.  Similarly, a person will not be held bound to accepting an offer he did not hear.  Glover  Partial reliance is sufficient - e.g. informant who gives info. to police to avoid arrest but aware of reward has a right to collect the reward money.

 

K.  Acceptance by performance with knowledge.  A person may accept an offer by performing, even without telling the offeror of the intent to accept, where offeror offers a unilateral contract and can see that performance has been made on the faith of his offer.  Award of merger commission to agent. Industrial America

 

L.  The emerging theory (see UCC 2-206(1)) is not to characterize contracts as bilateral or unilateral (for acceptance purposes) but to allow acceptance (unless otherwise specified) by any reasonable means under the circumstances.

 

M.  An offer that invites acceptance by performance will be deemed accepted by such performance unless the offeree manifests his intent not to accept.  No reliance on the terms of the contract is necessary.  Industrial America, (Court disposes of issue as a matter of law, no remanding to determine if any reliance).

 

N.  The Mailbox Rule:  R2K § 63(a):  Unless the offer provides otherwise, an acceptance made in a manner and by a medium invited by an offer is operative and completes the manifestation of mutual assent as soon as put out of the offeree's possession, without regard to whether it ever reaches the offeror.  For e-mail, offer is accepted when received, not transmitted.

 

O.  The subjective intent of offeree is immaterial.  If a reasonable offeror would be justified in relying upon the apparent intent of the offeree as manifested by his conduct, then "acceptance" will be deemed to have occurred.  Further, if the offeree intends to accept the offer but fails to communicate such intent in a manner which a reasonable offeror would understand as acceptance, no contract is formed.

 

P.  Where the offeree exercises dominion over things which are offered to him, such exercise of dominion in the absence of other circumstances showing a contrary intention is an acceptance.  R2K § 72.  Russell

 

Q.  If circumstances indicate the exercise of dominion is tortious, the offeror may at his option treat it as an acceptance, regardless of offeree's stated intention not to accept.

 

R.  R2K § 69:  "An offeree who does any act inconsistent with the offeror's ownership of offered property is bound in accordance with the offered terms unless they are manifestly unreasonable.  But if the act is wrongful as against the offeror it is an acceptance only if ratified by him."

 

S.  The offeror cannot force the offeree to reply by wording his offer:  "Your silence will be an acceptance of my offer."  R2K § 72.  However, silence may constitute an acceptance if by previous dealings the parties have established a pattern of accepting by silence.  R2K § 69.

 

T.  Because the goods are specially made and not suitable for sale to others, they fall within an exception to the Statute of Frauds and no written contract is necessary.  An implied contract may arise based on the course of dealings between two parties even though there is no written contract.  Smith-Scharff Paper Co.

 

 

2B.  THE NATURE AND EFFECT OF COUNTEROFFER.  An offer may be terminated by act of the parties or by rejection by the offeree.  A rejection by the offeree terminates the offeree's power of acceptance.  If the offeree later attempts to accept the offer notwithstanding the prior rejection, his "acceptance" is a mere counteroffer.

 

            1)  How effected.  A rejection may occur by either words or conduct, or by a qualified acceptance (which amounts to a counteroffer and therefore a rejection of the offer).  Any rejection terminates the power to accept and the contractual dealings.

 

            2)  Equivocation.  An acceptance by the offeree must be unequivocal and unqualified.  If a purported acceptance is qualified, it is legally insufficient as an acceptance.  Instead, a qualified acceptance will act as a counteroffer, which will operate as an implied rejection of the original offer.  However, the line between a "qualified" and an "unqualified" acceptance is not always clear.

 

            3)  Conditional acceptance.  An acceptance which includes any term or condition which was not part of the original offer is ordinarily considered a "qualified" acceptance and thus an implicit rejection of the offer.  However, if the condition was implicit in the offer or the if the offeree had a legal right to insist upon the condition under the terms of the offer, the acceptance will be considered an "unqualified" acceptance.  For example, X accepts Y's offer to sell land but includes a condition that Y give X good title (this is implied in Y's offer).

 

            4)  "Please enter an order for 2000 lbs iron rails plus splices for those rails at your current price" would be viewed as a counteroffer.  Better to phrase as "I accept" and "Please advise..."

 

            5) "Grumbling" acceptances.  Acceptances which express dissatisfaction but place no condition on the acceptance generally are considered "unqualified."  For example, "Ship the goods on the 10th, although I wish you could deliver sooner."  When a change or modification suggested in the offeree's reply is a demand for more favorable terms, then it goes beyond the mere "grumbling" acceptance and operates as an implied rejection of the offer.

 

            6) Inquiries and requests.  Acceptances which include inquiries or requests by the offeree for a better deal generally do not impair the original offer.

           

            7)  In transactions outside UCC 2-207, an acceptance in which the terms are at variance with the offer constitutes a rejection, and puts an end to the negotiations unless the original offeror assents to the modifications.

 

 

 

ACCEPTANCE UNDER THE UCC.

 

Additional terms.  Section 2-207 of the Code provides that an acceptance operates as such even if it contains additional terms different from those proposed by the offeror (unless the acceptance states that it is conditional on the assent to the additional terms, in which case the offeror would have to make a specific acceptance of the additional terms for a contract to exist).  FIRST, go to 2-207-1.  If no, go to 2-207-3.  If yes, go to 2-207-2(a),(b).

 

2-207-2(a)  The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for additions to the contract.  (If as P claims the parties reached an oral agreement, their contract is governed by UCC 2-207(1), which means the additional terms contained in D's acknowledgement would be treated as proposals and would become part of the contract unless they materially altered it.  Whether the terms materially altered the oral agreement is a question of fact to be determined at trial. Pevar)

 

2-207-2(b)  Where the contract is between merchants, these additional terms are part of the contract, unless (1) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer, (2) the additional terms materially alter the agreement, or (3) the offeror gives notification of objection to the new terms within a reasonable time.  (These items may be question for jury to decide.)

 

 

            8.  A clause that conditions acceptance on assent to additional or different terms leaves the parties without a contract as of the time the writings are changed.  There must be express assent to the additional or new terms.  Pevar v. Evans Product

 

            9.  Under UCC 2-207(3), the parties may yet have an agreement based on their conduct, even when there is no oral or written contract.  In this case, the parties continued dealing, which means they recognized the existence of a contract.  The contract would consist of the terms on which the writings agree, plus those terms supplied by the "gap filler" provisions of Article Two of the UCC. Pevar v. Evans Product Co., UCC §§ 2-314, 2-315.  (Warranty disclaimer drops out because no agreement.  Therefore, go to gap fillers by 2-315.)

 

            10. When two parties rely on self-serving forms drafted by attorneys instead of actually working out a mutually satisfactory agreement, the UCC attempts to enforce an agreement in spite of conflicting forms probably implements the parties' true intentions, but a better, if unrealistically idealistic, approach would be for parties to commercial transactions to negotiate sufficient detail to come up with consistent terms.

 

            11.  UCC does not apply to problems dealing with securities, real estate.

 

            12.  If I tell you my purpose in using the materials I am buying, I may create additional responsibilities for you.  UCC 2-315.

 

 

            13.  R2K § 40:  Where buyer has a rejection followed by acceptance, the first one the offeror receives is binding.  Farnsworth argues that the first manifestation should be binding, to prevent speculation that waits for events to change and then telegrams response.

 

 

3.  TERMINATION OF THE OFFER.  An offer may no longer be effectively accepted if the offeree's power of acceptance has been terminated by an act of the parties or by operation of law.

 

A.  TERMINATION BY ACT OF THE PARTIES.

 

(1)  Termination by non-acceptance in the allotted time period -- R2K § 36 provides that an offeree's power of acceptance may be terminated by (1) a rejection or counteroffer by the offeree, or (2) by lapse of time, or (3) revocation by the offeror prior to acceptance, or (4) death or incapacity of the offeror or offeree.  In addition, an offeree's power of acceptance is terminated by the nonoccurrence of any condition of acceptance under the terms of the offer.

 

(2)  Revocation of the offer by the offeror.  Where the offeror communicates a revocation before an acceptance by the offeree, the offer is terminated.

 

(a)  Requirements for effective revocation.  Assuming the offer can be revoked, the following are required to make an effective revocation:

 

            1)  Words or conduct.  The offeror's words or conduct must be sufficient for a reasonable person to interpret them as revocation.  Neither the Statute of Frauds nor contract law requires the revocation of an offer be in writing.

 

            2)  Communicated to the offeree.  The revocation must be communicated to the offeree (the offeror must at least make reasonable efforts to communicate the revocation).

 

            3)  Effective when received.  The revocation is generally held to be effective when received.  [Restatement (Second) 41]  A few states hold that it is effective when dispatched.

 

(3)  Communication from a third party.  Dickinson v. Dodds Revocation can come indirectly (rather than directly from the offeror), such as by a third person, or simply from the circumstances that would put a reasonable person on notice that the offeror had revoked the offer.  R2K § 42:  where an offer is for the sale of land, if offeree acquires reliable information of sale or intention to sell to someone else, before he has accepted, the offer is revoked.   R2K § 43: An offeree's power of acceptance is terminated when an offerer takes definite action inconsistent with sale to offeree and the offeree acquires reliable information to that effect.

 

 

B.  TERMINATION BY OPERATION OF LAW.

 

            (1)        By the lapse of time.  The offer lapses by operation of law after expiration (and before acceptance) of whatever period of time was specified in the offer.

 

                        (a)  Computation of time.  The period begins to run from the date of actual receipt by the offeree.  [Restatement (Second) 51]

 

                        (b)  Where no time period specified.  Where no specific time period is specified, then the offer lapses after a reasonable period of time.  Consideration is given the subject matter involved and all other relevant circumstances in determining what is a reasonable time.

 

                        (c)  Offers revocable where specified to remain open.  Note that just because the offer says it will remain open until some date does not mean that the offeror cannot validly revoke the offer before acceptance.

 

            (2)  By death or destruction of the subject matter of the offer.

 

            (3)  By death or insanity of the offeror or offeree.

 

            (4)        By the intervening illegality of the proposed contract.  A offers to loan B $1,000 at 10%; state law is passed that 8% interest is the maximum rate that can be charged.

 

 

4.  IRREVOCABLE OFFER:  NONDESTRUCTIBLE POWER OF ACCEPTANCE

 

General Rule:  An offer is revocable even if the offeror expressly promises not to revoke or gives a definite period during which the offer is to remain open.  There are a number of exceptions to this rule, however.

 

1. Options to purchase, if based on valid consideration, are contracts which may be specifically enforced (they are in effect irrevocable offers).  One dollar is valid consideration for an option, provided the dollar is paid or tendered.  Board of Control Eastern Mich. Univ

 

2.  A written acknowledgement of receipt (recital) of the consideration merely creates a rebuttable presumption that consideration has actually passed.  Board of Control of Eastern Mich. Univ. v. Burgess  Some courts would say a recital is enough, even if no consideration is paid.  R2K § 89 takes the position that an option in writing states that consideration has been received is binding even if consideration has not actually been paid.

 

3.  However, that which purports to be an option but fails for lack of valid consideration is still a simple offer to sell.  An option is a contract collateral to the offer to sell, making the offer irrevocable for a specified time.  A failure of consideration therefore affects only the collateral option contract, not the underlying offer.  The question then becomes whether offeror revoked simple offer prior to acceptance.

 

 

A.  EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE.

 

            (1) Firm offers under the UCC.  A signed, written offer to buy or sell goods, which states that it will be kept open for a definite time (or if no time is stated, for a reasonable period of time) may not be revoked for this period (so long as the period is no longer than three months).  [UCC 2-205] - does not apply to REAL ESTATE.

 

            (2)  Offers for consideration.  If the offeree has given any consideration (even nominal consideration) for the offer, the offer then becomes an option and is not revocable for the period stated therein.  [Restatement (second) 24A]

 

            Recitals of consideration.  Where there is a recital that consideration has been received for the option, the general rule has been that this recital is not conclusive (the courts reserve the right to see if the consideration was actually paid).  But R2K § 89 provides that an offer is binding as an option if it is in writing, signed by the offeror, and recites a purported consideration.

 

            (3) A conditional exercise of an option does not preclude a later unconditional exercise of the option within the option period.  Counteroffers do not terminate the power to accept within the option period.  Humble Oil v. Westside Investment

 

            (4) Rejection does not terminate the option power.  R2K § 37.

 

            (5)  Revocation of offer for a unilateral contract after past partial performance.  Ordinarily, a unilateral offer may be revoked at any time prior to the offeree's completing the act of acceptance called for in the offer.  But a difficult problem is presented where the act requested will take some time to complete and the offeror attempts to revoke after the offeree has started performance.  Under modern rules, where the offeree has rendered substantial part performance, courts will not permit revocation of the unilateral offer by the offeror.

 

                        a) An offer of a unilateral contract can be revoked at any time prior to performance, even if the offeror knows that the offeree intends to perform.  Petterson v. Pattberg.  (On exam, answer quoting arguments under both rules)  Even under the modern rules disallowing revocation with substantial part performance rendered by the offeree, the result in this case would be the same since the act required for acceptance was payment, and revocation came before payment.

 

                        b) Part performance of the consideration may transform the unilateral contract into an option contract, and thus make it irrevocable during the time stated.  Where an offer invites an offeree to accept by rendering a performance (unilateral) and not a promissory acceptance (bilateral), an option contract or contract with a condition is created when the offeree begins the invited performance or tenders part of it.  The condition is full performance by the offeree.  What constitutes part performance will vary from case to case.  Thus, until there is action by the offeree - a partial performance pursuant to the offer - the offeror may revoke, even if his offer is an exclusive agency or an exclusive right-to-sell.  Marchiondo v. Scheck

 

                        c) Thus, until there is action by the offeree - a partial performance pursuant to the offer - the offeror may revoke, even if his offer is an exclusive agency or an exclusive right-to-sell.  Marchiondo

 

                        d)  Implied promise not to revoke.  The Restatement position (followed by most courts) is that where an act will take some time to complete, there is a promise implied in the offer that the offeror will not revoke once the offeree has made a substantial beginning of performance, provided that performance is actually completed within the time required by the offer.  RATIONALE:  real estate agents devoting much time.

 

 

 

C.  INSUFFICIENT AGREEMENT:  INCOMPLETE, INDEFINITE, AND DEFERRED TERMS

 

1.  The requirement of definiteness and certainty of terms.  The terms of the offer must be sufficiently clear and complete so that the court can determine what the parties intended and can fix damages in case of nonperformance.  R2K § 32, 33.

 

2. The essential terms.  A contract must cover (expressly or impliedly) the following four essential terms:  (1) parties to the contract;  (2) the subject matter of the contract;  (3) time for performance;  and  (4) price.

 

3.  Implication of reasonable terms.  The essential terms must either be expressly stated in the contract or be capable of reasonable implication from the agreement.  The general trend of the courts is to adopt a policy of liberal construction so as to uphold the reasonable expectations of the parties; thus, the court will usually imply reasonable terms (i.e., implied-in-fact terms from the dealings and relationship of the parties) where none are expressly covered by the parties.

 

            Example - price.  (i)  Where price is completely omitted.  Where the parties have made no provision for price but a charge was intended, the court will normally imply a "reasonable price" (e.g., fair market value of goods).

 

            (ii)  Where the price stated is indefinite.  Often, however, where the parties have made some attempt to include terms on the price but it is stated in such a vague way as to unintelligible, the courts will often refuse to imply a reasonable price, and the contract will be unenforceable due to lack of certainty on an essential term.  For example, A agrees to employ B "at not exceeding $300 per week."

 

4.  The Uniform Commercial Code.  In contracts for the sale of goods, the omission of one or more essential terms does not render an offer invalid, as long as it appears the parties intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.  [UCC 2-204]  In effect, the Restatement (2nd) 32 takes this same approach with respect to all contracts.

 

5.  The statement "fair share of the profits" is too vague, indefinite, and uncertain to form a binding contract.  The intention of the parties is pure conjecture.  A fair share may range from a nominal sum to a substantial amount.  The courts cannot aid parties in such a case when they are unable or unwilling to agree upon the terms of their own proposed contract.  Varney v. Ditmars  Architect-draftsman case.

 

6.  Implications of reasonable terms.  The essential terms must either be expressly stated in the contract or be capable of reasonable implication from the agreement.  The general trend of the courts is now to adopt a policy